Constructive modal logics I  by Wijesekera, Duminda
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 50 (1990) 271-301 
North-Holland 
271 
CONSTRUCTIVE MODAL LOGICS I 
Duminda WIJESEKERA* 
Mathematical Sciences Institute, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-2602, USA 
Communicated by A. Nerode 
Received 9 November 1989; revised 11 July 1990 
We often have to draw conclusions about states of machines in computer science and about 
states of knowledge and belief in artificial intelligence (AI) based on partial information. 
Nerode (1990) suggested using constructive (equivalently, intuitionistic) logic as the language 
to express such deductions and also suggested designing appropriate intuitionistic Kripke 
frames to express the partial information. Following this program, Nerode and Wijesekera 
(1990) developed syntax, semantics and completeness for a system of intuitionistic dynamic 
logic for proving properties of concurrent programs. Like all dynamics logics, this was a logic of 
many modalities, each expressing a program, but in intuitionistic rather than in classical logic. 
In that logic, both box and diamond are needed, but these two are not intuitionistically 
interdefinable and, worse, diamond does not distribute over ‘or’. except for sequential 
programs. This also happens in other contemplated computer science and AI applications, and 
leads outside the class of constructive logics investigated in the literature. The present paper 
fills this gap. We provide intuitionistic logics with independent box and diamond without 
assuming distribution of diamond over ‘or’. The completeness theorem is based on intuitionistic 
Kripke frames (partially ordered sets of increasing worlds), but equipped with an additional, 
quite separate accessibility relation between worlds. In the interpretation of Nerode and 
Wijesekera (1990), worlds under the partial order represent states of partial knowledge, the 
accessibility represents change in state of partial knowledge resulting from executing a specific 
program. But there are many other computer science interpretations. This formalism covers all 
computer science applications of which we are aware. We also give a cut elimination theorem 
and algebraic and topological formulations, since these present some new difficulties. Finally, 
these results were obtained prior to those in Nerode and Wijesekera (1990). 
1. Syntax, semantics and completeness 
1.1. Introduction 
We develop propositional and predicate modal intuitionistic logic based on 
minimal axioms for the modal connectives box (necessity) and diamond (pos- 
sibility). We give a correspondingly general modal intuitionistic Kripke semantics 
with completeness theorems. The minimality of the axioms is indicated by the 
observation that, with these axioms, box and diamond are not interdefinable. In 
fact, they should not be interdefinable if an intuitionistic meaning is given to their 
‘possible worlds’ interpretations. (See also [2] for a treatment of independent box 
and diamond. Their system was based on purely philosophical considerations, not 
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computer science. Our systems are motivated instead by intended computer 
science applications to areas such as dynamic logic and the logic of belief.) Our 
minimal set of axioms and semantics are general enough to cover the natural 
axioms and semantics of all intended computer science areas of application of 
which we know, while still meeting stringent requirements of constructivity. Our 
systems are fully capable of being implemented naturally in such constructive 
programming environments as Constable’s NUPRL (an implementation of 
extensions of Martin-Liif’s predicative intuitionistic type theory) or Huet- 
Coquand’s CONSTRUCTIONS (an implementation of extensions of Girard’s impre- 
dicative intuitionistic type theory). For other work on intuitionistic modal logics 
and their applications, see [3, 6-10, 13, 28, 29, 33, 371. 
The intuition behind our semantics is that a possible world for the intuitionistic 
Kripke model should represent a partial state of knowledge about a full classical 
relational system. Further, the modality should be based on an accessibility 
relation between these partial states of knowledge. So for worlds (partial states of 
knowledge) w, u, w s u has the intuitive interpretation that partial state of 
knowledge r~ has at least as much knowledge as partial state of knowledge w. Let 
us use the computer science special case of constructive concurrent dynamic logic 
(CCDL) of [27] t o motivate our minimal system of intuitionistic modal logic more 
completely. This is historically inaccurate, since our minimal system was 
developed first, at Nerode’s suggestion, but CCDL is too good a motivation to 
omit. Our minimal system abstracts the intuitionistic modal logic of a single 
imperative program P executed on a single nondeterministic machine, sequential 
or concurrent. This minimal system, unlike dynamic logic, wholly omits all 
apparatus for building up complex programs from simple programs and concentr- 
ates instead on the intrinsic modal intuitionistic logic of the transition, or 
accessibility, relation R from the state S, to state S,, where S, R S, say P, starting 
on the machine in state Si, has at least one execution sequence completing 
execution in states S,. In CCDL [27], a state S, on which R acts, represents 
partial information, rather than total information, about a complete machine 
state S. (In classical dynamic logic, only complete machine states are considered.) 
In the intuitionistic Kripke frames used in CCDL, each world represents partial 
information about a single complete machine state. If worlds S1, S, represent 
partial information about the same machine state S, then in the Kripke frame 
partial ordering s of worlds, S, s S, iff S, contains at least as much information 
about state S as S1 does. If Tr is a world representing partial information about a 
complete machine state T other than the complete machine state S referred to 
above, then T, is incomparable under s with the Sr, S,, . . . representing partial 
information about S. For classical dynamic logic, the abstract features of a single 
program accessibility are reflected algebraically by a modal Boolean algebra. 
There should be a corresponding notion of an intuitionistic modal algebra, 
corresponding to the intuitionistic modal logic of the accessibility relation of a 
single program acting on partial information about machine states. Our minimal 
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modal intuitionistic logic has this role. Its algebraic form is modal Heyting 
algebra, developed in a later section. Finally, our minimal system is broad enough 
to be used in other computer science and artificial intelligence applications under 
development jointly with Nerode. 
Axioms, rules of inference, Kripke semantics, algebraic semantics, and 
topological semantics are developed in Sections 1 and 2. Constructive content is 
brought out by a cut elimination theorem for an LJ-style calculus in Section 1.2. 
Soundness of axioms and rules of inference with respect to the intended semantics 
is proved in Section 1.3. Completeness is proved in Section 1.4. The cut rule is 
shown to be eliminable in Section 1.5; cut elimination is useful for suggesting 
term rewriting implementations of modal intuitionistic logics in high level 
functional programming languages such as Constable’s NUPRL, or Huet- 
Coquand’s CONSTRUCHONS 
Language 
The language is that of classical predicate modal logic with A, v , +, 1, 3, If, 
Cl and 0 as logical connectives. The deductive theory will be constructive 
(intuitionistic). The semantics will be Kripke intuitionistic frames, equipped with 
an additional accessibility relation between worlds. 
Notational conventions. Lower-case letters from the beginning of the alphabet, 
possibly with integer subscripts, denote individual constants. CO is the set of 
individual constants. Upper-case letters from the beginning of the alphabet, 
possibly with integer subscripts, denote atomic predicates. Lower-case letters 
from the end of the alphabet, possibly with integer subscripts, denote individual 
variables. X is the set of all variables xi. Lower-case Greek letters stand for 
formulas. Upper-case Greek letters stand for sets of formulas. 
Definition 1.1.1. Terms are individual variables or individual constants. 
Definition 1.1.2. Suppose that A@,, . . . , Xi, . , . , xi, . . . , x,) is an atomic for- 
mula, and that ti, . . . , tj are terms. Then A@,, . . . , &/xi, . . . , tj/Xj, . . . , x,) is 
called the instantiation of xi, . . . , Xi to ti, . . . , tj in the atomic formula 
A(x,, . . . ) Xi, . . * ) Xj, . . s ) x,). 
Definition 1.1.3. The inductive definition offormula is as follows. 
(1) Every instantiation of every atomic formula is a formula. 
(2) If r&, 8 are formulas, then so are (iv), (r/j+ O), (q A O), (111 v O), (Oly) 
and (0111). 
(3) If v(x) is a formula, then so are ((Zlx)~(x)) and ((VX)I&(X)). 
We omit parentheses for readibility. We follow standard usage for the notions 
of free and bound variables. 
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Definition 1.1.3 is easily extended to an arbitrary instantiation of terms to 
free variables in an arbitrary formula. We omit the details. Let 
l#(.“c,, . . . f ti/Xi, . . . ) tj/Xj, . . . 7 x,) denote the instantiation of the terms ti, . . . , tj 
for the free instances of the variables xi, . . . , Xi- Finally as usual, a sentence is a 
formula with no free variables. 
Definition 1.1.4. A quintuple (K, S, D, R, It) is an intuitionistic modal frame if 
(l)(i) (K, S) is a partially ordered set and R is any binary relation on K; 
(ii) D is a function assigning nonempty sets to the elements of K satisfying: 
for all k, k’ E K, ksk’ implies D(k) c D(k’) and for all k, k’ E K, 
k R k’ implies D(k) c D(k’). 
(2) With additional constant symbols added to the language for each element 
of D = U {D(k): k E K}, we assume given a relation 11 is a relation between 
elements of K and atomic statements in this extended language such that 
k IF A(&) implies di E D(k) for 1 s i s II, 
. 
k It A(&) implies k’ It- A(d,) for all k’ s k. 
(3) Then Ik is extended to all sentences QI in the extended language allowing 
constants in D(k) by the inductive definition below. 
(i) k 11 Q, v I+!J if k It- q or k It IJJ. 
(ii) k It cp A q if k IF Q, and k It I). 
(iii) k Ik IJJ+ W, if, for all k’ > k, k’ II- cp implies k’ It T/I. 
(iv) k Itirp if, for all k’ 2 k, it is not the case that k’ Ik q. 
(v) k It q g, if, for all k ’ P k and for all k” such that k’ R k”, we have that 
k” It ~1. 
(vi) k IF 0~ if, for all k ’ 2 k, there is a k” such that k’ R k” and k” It q. 
(vii) k It 3x q(x) if there exists a d E D(k) such that k It q(d). 
(viii) k It Vx q(x), if, for all k ’ 2 k and for all d E D(k’), k’ It q(d). 
Satisfaction 
Definition 1.1.5. Let M = (K, D, <, R, It) be an intuitionistic modal frame. 
(1) A sentence p, is satisfied at k E K if k It QX A set Tof sentences is satisfied at 
k if every member of r is satisfied at k. 
(2) cp is satisjiable in M = (K, D, =z, R, It) if there is k E K with q satisfied at 
k. 
(3) Q, is satihfiable if there is an intuitionistic modal frame M in which q is 
satisfiable. 
(4) If r is a set of statements, rltM 4p if for each k E K, k It r implies k It q. 
(5) r It cp if for all intuitionistic modal frames M, rlkM rp. 
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Notice that our definition of Tll- q is ‘local’ to one k at a time. It does not say 
that if M is any intuitionistic modal frame and for all k in K all I+Q in rare satisfied 
at k, then for all k in K, Q, is satisfied at k. This is a necessary change from most 
modal logic literature, better suited for such applications as dynamics logic in 
computer science. Now we prove the fundamental elementary property of any 
intuitionistic forcing relation. 
Lemma 1.1.6 (Monotonicity lemma). Let M = (K, D, s, R, It) be an intuitionis- 
tic modal frame. Let k, k’ E K and assume that k s k’. Let Q, be any sentence. If 
k tt go, then also k’ IF cp. 
Proof. The proof is as usual by induction on the length of sentences. We give 
only the inductive cases involving modal connectives. 
For Cl. Suppose that k It q cp and that k ’ 2 k. Let k” and k”’ be such that k” * k’ 
and k” R k”‘. Then k d k”. Hence k It q lg, implies that k”‘It QZJ. 
For 0. Suppose that k It Ocp and that k” 3 k’ 3 k. Then k”> k implies that 
there is a k”’ such that k” R k”’ and k”’ It ~1. This gives k’ I10q1. q 
1.2. Sequent calculus 
Here we formulate a modal intuitionistic Gentzen sequent calculus, which we 
prove is sound and complete with respect to the proposed semantics. All the 
sequent calculus notation of Takeuti [38] is used. Any questions of notation can 
be resolved by consulting that source. For this section, upper-case Greek letters 
represent finite sequences of sentences. Then q, r represents the sequent 
obtained by appending Q, to the head of r. Similarly r, q represents the sequent 
obtained by appending Q, to the tail of r. If r = ( yl, . . . , yti), then let Or 
denote (Cly,, . . . , Uy,). 
Initial sequents (Axioms) 
A >>A 
Structural rules 
T>>A 
cp, r>> A’ 
cp, P, r>> A 
r >> A 
l-s A, cp 
(p,r>>A ’ 
r, q, 8, fl7>>d 
r, 0, q, II>>4 
Weakening 
r>> q, v, A 
l-xv, A ' 
Contraction 
r>>A, tp, 8,A 
l->>A, 0, q,A' 
Exchange 
r>>A,cp cp,n>>n 
r,II>>A,n ’ 
cut 
276 
Logical rules 
l->> A, Q, 
TQ), r>> A’ 
p, r>> A 
g~8,r>>A’ 
p, r>> A 8, r>> A 
qve,r>>d ’ 
r>>d, Q, q, e>>n 
p+v,, r, 824, n ’ 
W), r>> A 
vx $!J(x), r>> A’ 
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8, r>>d md, Q, mu, e 
g,Ae,r>>d’ r>>d,qAe ’ 
r>> A, Q, r>>d, e 
ra,~ve’ n>d,~ve’ 
r >> V(a) 
r >> v~ V,(X) ’ 
provided the lower sequent is free of a. 
q(a), r>> A r>> A, cp(t) 
3x cp(x), r >> A ’ r>> A, 3xcp(x)’ 
where the lower sequent is free of a. 
Modal rules 
r, rp 2 v r, Q, 3 r>> 3 
q cov>o& or, 0~ >> ’ q r>>m+i 
Definition 1.2.1. A sequent of the form r> A is W-like if A contains at most 
one sentence. 
Adopt the convention that r1 A means that we use the same proof rules as 
above, but with the consequent A always restricted to contain at most one 
sentence. This is called the W-like form of the calculus, following Takeuti [38]. 
Lemma 1.2.2. The sequent calculus presented above and its W-like forms are 
equivalent, i.e., r>> B1, . . . , B, iff rk B1 v . . . v B,. 
Proof. This is by induction on the proof tree following the lines of [38]. The 
modal rules can be applied only for LJ-like sequents. Therefore, in the inductive 
proof, the modal rules do not present extra cases. 0 
1.3. Soundness of the sequent calculus 
By abuse of notation, for a sequent of the form Tt q, r It- q will mean that 
{YI, * * * , y,,} IF q, where r= (I% . . . , m>. 
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Theorem 1.3.1 (Soundness). Zf rk q, then rlI~1. 
Proof. The method of proof is by induction on the proof tree as usual. First, one 
shows that for each proof rule of the form 
AI-0 
A’ t 19’ 
if A It 8, then so is A’ IF 19’. Similarly, for rules of the form 
one shows that if A, It 8, and A2 It &, then A It 8. Finally, for the only axiom, 
C+I 1 q, Q, It QX By induction on the proof tree of Tt q, it follows Tit q. 
For the nonmodal rules the proof is the same as that for showing the soundness 
of the W-rules with respect to nonmodal Kripke frames, so these cases are 
omitted. For the modal rules, assume that (K, D, <, R, IF) is any intuitionistic 
modal frame. Let k E K. For the rule 
suppose that k IFEW. To show that k It q lq, let k’, k” be such 
k’ R k”. Since k It Or, k” It K Therefore k” It cp. Hence k Ik 0~. 
For the rule 
suppose that k It Or and that k It Ogz~ The latter implies that for all k’ 2 k, there 
that ksk’ and 
is a k” E K such that k’ R k” and k” It CJX Since k It Or, we get k” II r Hence 
k”lt r, CJJ. By the inductive assumption, k”It I). Hence k lt01J~. 
For the rule 
suppose that k It Or, 0~. Then for all k’ 3 k, there is a k” E K such that k’ R k” 
and k” It QI Since k It Or, we get k” It r, QI. By the inductive assumption this is 
impossible. 
This completes the proof of soundness. 0 
1.4. Completeness of the sequent calculus 
This section proves that the sequent calculus of Section 1.2 is complete with 
respect to the semantics given in Section 1.1. The usual completeness proof for 
classical modal logic uses as worlds maximal consistent sets closed under 
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modalities and uses an accessibility relation between these worlds. There is no 
partial ordering of increasing information present. The usual completeness proof 
for intuitionistic nonmodal logic uses prime filters as possible worlds, partially 
ordered by inclusion. There are no modalities in the calculus, and no separate 
accessbility in the frame. The first thought is that for intuitionistic modal logic we 
should combine these two methodologies, and use certain prime filters and an 
appropriate accessibility between prime filters to reflect the modality. If we had 
assumed the distributivity of diamond over ‘or’, we can easily carry this program 
out. But to cover all intended computer science applications, we have to avoid 
using this axiom of distributivity. In the completeness proof for our systems, but 
not in the direct definition of intuitionistic modal frames, we need a more subtle 
‘set accessibility’ in which single prime filters access sets of prime filters instead of 
individual prime filters. This device is embodied in the notion of a ‘segment’ given 
below. Intuitionistic modal logics needing such ‘segments’ arise in interpreting 
partial information in computer science, see [27]. There a ‘set’ accessibility arises 
in dynamic logic whenever we interpret a concurrent program in Peleg concurrent 
transition systems which are not sequential. Not allowing such ‘set’ accessibility 
would restrict attention to sequential programs, and indeed corresponds roughly 
to assuming diamond distributes over ‘or’. 
Notation 1.4.1. Let r be a set of sentences. By abuse of notation, write l-t (p if 
there is a finite subset of sentences r’ of r such that r’ l- q~. Then cp is called a 
consequence of r. Call r deductively closed if r contains all its consequences. 
Definition 1.4.2. Let r be a set of sentences in language L. Then r is saturated in 
L if the following conditions hold: 
(i) r is consistent and deductively closed. 
(ii) IfqvrjjeT, theng,ErorqeE 
(iii) If 3x q(x) E r, then q(c) E rfor some c in L. 
Notation 1.4.3. Let L be a countable language, let C be a countable set of 
individual constants outside L. Let L(C) denotes the language formed from L by 
including C. 
Lemma 1.4.4. In a countable intuitionistic modal logic language L, suppose that 
(r t q) is not true. Then there is a r’ 2 r such that r’ is saturated in L(C) and 
(r’ t cp) is not true. 
Proof. See [40]. 0 
Theorem 1.4.5 (Completeness). Suppose that (r E q) is not true. Then there exists 
a modal frame (K, D, G, R, It ) and a kO E K such that kO It r, but not (k, It q). 
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Proof. Work entirely with sets C of constants which are subsets of a countable 
master set of constants C outside L. Call (I’, C) a base if r is saturated with 
respect to L(C). For (&,, C,) a base and U a set of bases, call ((To, C,), U) a 
segment if: 
(i) C, c Cr for each (r, C,) E U. 
(ii) If q Q, E &,, then q E rfor each (r, C,) E U. 
(iii) If Oq E r, then th ere is a (A, C,) E U such that Q, E A. 
For the segment S = ((I;,, C,), U), call (TO, C,) the head of the segment and 
denote it by H(S), call U the tail of the segment and denote it by T(S). So 
segment S = (H(S), T(S)). Let S denote the set of all segments constructed out of 
the sentences of L(C). Define 5 on segments L(C) as follows: 
((r, C,), U) 5 ((r’, C,,), U’) iff rs r’ and C,s CrP. 
Let r be a set of sentences and let q be a sentence such that (r t rp) does not 
hold. By Lemma 1.4.4, such a r can be extended to a saturated G in an L(C,) 
where (&I- q) is not true. Let r, = {q: Clap E r,}. For each sentence of the form 
00 with 00 E &, let r, = c, U {e}. Now r, is consistent, since r, t implies that 
there exist sentences yl, . . . , yn E rb for which y,, y2, . . . , l/n, 8 t . The 0 rule 
implies then that q y,, q ly,, . . . , my,,, 06’ 1, which implies r,1. This contradicts 
G being saturated. Since each r, is consistent we can use Lemma 1.4.4 to extend 
this set to a set I’& saturated with respect to L(C,,), with C,, 2 C,. Call 
(r;, C,,), Be. Then ((To, C,), {Be: 00 E I;,}) is a segment. Let SO= 
((To, C,), {B,: 00 E &}), let SEG,, = {SO}. For each i, define T and SEG, by 
induction as follows. 
Let r = {S ES: H(S) E T(S’) for some S’ E SEG,} 
and SEG,+, = {S ES: S 2 S’ for some S’ E T U SEG;}. 
Let SEG = UT=,=,, SEG,. The modal intuitionistic frame (K, D, G, R, Ik) is 
defined as follows. Let K = SEG. Define c on K as 5. Define accessibility R on 
K as S R S’ iff H(S’) E T(S). F or each k E K define D(k) = CrU Co, where 
H(k) = (r, C,). The domain function satisfies the required monotonicity condi- 
tions. Define IF on the atomic statements by 
k IFA iff dj E D(k) for 1 s i c IE and A(&) E r, where head(k) = (r, C,). 
Extend It to all sentences as it was done in Definition 1.1.4. Forcing is of 
course monotone. 
Lemma 1.4.6. Let H(k) = (r, C,) E K. Then for any sentence Q, in the language of 
L(C,), k It Q, iff Q, E ZY 
Proof. This is proved by induction on the complexity of 47. When Q, is an instance 
of an atomic formula, the result follows from the definition of It. When Q, is a 
nonatomic formula, our induction assumption is that the result is true for all 
subformulas of cp and for all k E K. 
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(1) Suppose that Q, is Q?~ A q2. If k It q1 A cp2, then k It cp, and k It qz, 
therefore by the induction assumption q1 E r and q2 E K Since r is deductively 
closed, q1 A q2 E lY Conversely, if (pl A q2 E r, then, since r is deductively 
closed, we get q, E r and q2 E r Hence k It q1 and k II- q2, and therefore 
kit% A %. 
(2) Suppose that ~1 is q1 v ~1~. If k It q1 v cp2, then either k It cpl or k II- q2. 
Without loss of generality, if k It ql, then by the inductive assumption q, E lY 
Since r is deductively closed, vi v q2 E I’. Conversely, if q1 v (p2 E r, then r is 
saturated implies that either q1 E r or q2 E K Without loss of generality, if 
qi E r, then by the inductive assumption, k Ik cp,. Hence k It cpl v cp2. 
(3) Suppose that Q, is cpl-+ q2. If k It cpl-, q2 and vpl+ q2 $ r, then (r I- q,+ 
q2) is not true. The proof rules for + imply that (r, q1 t q2) is not true either. By 
Lemma 1.4.4 choose a r’ saturated with respect to some L(C,,), where Cr, 2 Cr 
and I” 2 r U { cpI}, but v2 $ r’. Carry out the same proof that was used to 
construct SO in the proof of the main theorem and construct a segment 
k’ = ((I”, Cr), A,.), for some set of bases Arr. By the inductive assumption for 
I” there is a k’ 2 k with k’ It q1 but not k’ It tp2. But this contradicts k It ql+ q2. 
Conversely, suppose that ql+ q2 E r and not k It cpl+ cp2. Then there exists a 
k’ E K with k’s k and k’ It cpI and not k’ It q2. Therefore, by the inductive 
assumption, we get that sp, E r’ and q2 $ r’, where H(k’) = (r’, C,.). Since 
k’ 2 k, we get that I” 2 r. SO vi+ q2 E r”. Since r’ is deductively close, we 
conclude that q2 E r’, a contradiction. 
(4) Suppose that q is l~li. The proof is similar to that for case 3. 
(5) Suppose that (p is 3x vi(x). If rlt 3x (p(x), then rlk q,(c) for some 
c E C,U Co. Hence, by the inductive assumption, vi(c) E lY Since r is deduc- 
tively closed, 3x Q),(X) E ZY Conversely, if 3x q+(x) E r, then by the saturation of 
r, vi(c) E r for some c E CP By inductive assumption, k IF rpl(c). Hence 
k II 3x Q)&). 
(6) Suppose that Q, is Vx ~)i(x). Suppose that k lttlx rpl(x) and Vx Q),(X) $ r 
Then for a new d not appearing in CrU C,,, it is not the case that r k qr(d). 
Hence by Lemma 1.4.4, we can extend (r, C,) to a (r’, C,.) such that ql(d) $ r’ 
and d E Cr. By using the same construction as for SO in Theorem 1.4.5, we can 
construct a segment ((r’, C,.), A,,). So it is not the case that k’ It q,(d), where 
k’ corresponds to the segment ((r’, C,.), A,,) with d E D(k’). Conversely, 
suppose that Vx ql(x) E r Then for all K’ 2 K, where H(K’) = (I”, C,,), we 
have Vx ql(x) E r’. Since r’ is deductively closed, VI(d) E r’ for any d E Crv U 
C,. Hence k II Vx vi(x). 
(7) Suppose that rp = 0~~. If k ItOtp, and Orp, I$ r, then for each 00 E r, let 
r, = { 13) U r, with r = {A: q A E r}. Then it is not the case that (re t vi); for 
otherwise, 8, r 1 ql, hence by the diamond rule 00, Tt Oql, a contradiction. 
So by Lemma 1.4.4 we can extend r, to a r; saturated with respect to some 
C, 2 Cr and q1 $ I’;. Now we see that k’ = ((I”, C,,), {(To, C,): 00 E r}) is a 
segment, where (r’, Cr.) = (I’, C,). Note that k’ R k” implies H(k”) = (ro, C,) 
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for some r,. Because vi $ r,, by the inductive hypothesis it is not true that 
((G, C,) It vi). Hence there exists a k’ E K such that no k” with k’ R k” satisfies 
(k”It Q),). This contradicts k It 0~~. Conversely, if 0~ E r, then for all k’ 2 k, 
for H(k’) = (r’, Cr.), we get that 0~ E r’. Hence 9, E r” for some k” with 
k’ R k”. If H(k”) = (rl, C,-), by the inductive assumption we get k” It q. 
(8) Suppose that q is 0~~. If k It q lq, and Elq, 4 r, then for each 00 E r, let 
r, be a saturated extension of { 0) U I= as before. It is false that (r t vi), hence 
we can extend r to a saturated r’ so that vi 4 r’. Now 
((r, C,), {(rr, C,,)> U {(G, CT,): Ve E w = k’ 
is a segment. Using the same method as at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 
1.4.5, we can create segments corresponding to T(k’). Let k” be the segment with 
H(k”) = (I”, C,,). Then we have k’, k” with k G k’ and k’ R k”, but not (k” It q). 
This contradicts (k II- 0~). Conversely, suppose that q lq, E l-. Then q lv, E I” for 
each k’ 2 k with H(k’) = I”. Therefore for any k” with k’ R k” and (r”, C,.) = 
H(k”), we have that vi E I”‘. By the inductive hypotheses we conclude that 
k” It- ql. 
This ends the proof of Lemma 1.4.6, and Lemma 1.4.6 completes the proof of 
the completeness Theorem 1.4.5. 0 
1.5. Hilbert style axioms 
It is possible to develop Hilbert style axioms from the sequent formulation of 
Section 1.2. We devote this section to that task. 
Axioms 
(i) Axioms for intuitionistic predicate logic. 
(ii) q (V-+ rP)--, (n~?+oV). 
(iii) q (V-+ vjI)+(Vv--+Vv). 
(iv) W*Vo(~-~)-V% 
(VI V(v AT)-,(P A--P* 
Rules of inference 
(i) (Modus ponens) Q, q+II, 
V . 
(ii) If tq, then t0~. 
(iii) Quantifier rules 
V-, V(x) V(x)-+ 97 
Q1-, v.X V(x) 3.x G+)* V ’ 
with the usual restrictions. 
The equivalence of this Hilbert style system with the sequent formulation 
previously given is the content of the following lemma. 
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Lemma 1.5.1. Let AI- 111 mean that 111 is provable from A in the Hilbert style 
system. Then A 1 I) if and only if A I- $I. 
Proof. To show that ‘if At- IJJ,, then A k I/J’, it is enough to show that the axioms 
of the Hilbert style formulation are theorems of the sequent calculus and to 
notice that the proof rules of the Hilbert system are valid instances of rules in the 
sequent calculus. 
(1) The axioms of intuitionistic predicate calculus are proved as usual for 
sequent calculus. 
(2) For (ii), 
For (iv), 
tocv Alv)+(v AT) . 
The proof rules are instances of W-like rules. 
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Conversely, to show that ‘if At r/~, then At- cp’, it is enough to justify the steps 
that use the modal rules in a sequent-style proof by means of the Hilbert system. 
So we show that the modal rules are derived rules of the Hilbert system. 
By inductive hypothesis, assume that r I- QJ. By repeated application of the 
deduction theorem, I- Y, + (Y2+ (y3-+ * * * (yfl + QI))), where r = { yi: i = 1, n}. 
By generalization, t- q (y,+ (YZ’(Y3’ * * * (m+ ~9))). BY applying q (V+ 
O)+ (flcP+ q Q), we get k (my,+ (OY~+ (OY~*. . . (my,+ 0~)))). By 
modus ponens, we get Cork q g?. 
By inductive hypothesis, suppose that r, p, t- 8. Then r t- v-f 8. Hence 
q rl- q (~-+ 0) by the argument used above. By modus ponens and axiom (iii), 
Or t- 0~ + 00. By the deduction theorem, Or, 0~ k 00. 
(3) For 
the argument follows from (2) and the axiom O(6 A -10) --;, (8 A 10). 0 
2. Cut elimination, algebraic and topological semantics 
2.1. Freedom of cut and its consequences 
This section gives a proof of the ‘freedom of cut’ in the W-like sequent calculus 
of Section 1.2. The notation and general outline of Takeuti’s proof of cut 
elimination [38, p. 21-281 are used, the reader is referred there for all 
unexplained notations. Since Takeuti’s calculus has no modalities, we have to 
define exactly all notions where modalities play an essential role. The cases that 
are necessary to establish the freedom of cut with the modal connectives are the 
only ones presented here. Notions from sequent calculus such as ‘deduction tree’ 
and a ‘thread’ in a deduction tree are used without definition. The notion of a 
‘principal formula’ of an inference figure is assumed known and is indicated 
beside the figure+.g. 
is an inference figure with principal formula q. When the sequent roccurs in the 
above inference figure, I’* denotes the sequent r with occurrences of ~1 deleted. 
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The following rule, known as Mix rule, is substituted for cut. 
Mix rule 
The following lemma is now a triviality. 
Lemma 2.1.1. The Cut and Mix rules are equivalent. 
Proof. See [38]. Cl 
Definition 2.1.2. Let P be a proof which contains a mix rule only as the last 
inference 
where q is the mix formula. 
(1) The rank of a thread above s1 is the number of consecutive sequents that 
contain the formula q, starting from s1 and counting upwards. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
Left rank of P = rank,(P) = max{rank(F, P) :F is a left thread}, 
Right rank of P = rank,(P) = max{rank(F, P): F is a right thread}. 
Rank(P) = rank,(P) + rank,(P). 
Grade(q) = number of logical connectives occurring in QX 
Grade of a mix rule = grade of the principal formula of the mix rule. 
Lemma 2.1.3. If P is a proof of r k cp in which only one mix occurs, and that 
occurring as the last inference, then Tt Q, is provable without a mix. 
Proof. The proof is by double induction on the rank and the grade. The inductive 
hypothesis is that the statement of the lemma is valid for all formulas of lower 
grade, and we prove it for proofs of current grade. 
Case 1. rank= 2. Let P be 
Case 1.1. Either s1 or s2 is an initial sequent. The proof is the same as 
Takeuti’s. 
Case 1.2. Either s, or s2 is a structural rule. The proof is the same as Takeuti’s. 
Case 1.3. Both s1 and s2 are logical rules. In this case, rank = 2 implies 
rank, = 1 = rank,. Hence the principal formula must be the mix formula. Only 
where a modal rule is involved will it be presented. The other cases are the same 
as in [38]. 
Ak8 rite, 
1.3.1. s*= 
mm8 q moe1 
on, on* t q e1 (me). S 
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By the inductive assumption there is a mix-free proof of 
A;OU*~;O’(B). 
7 1 
Now apply the modal rule q to get 
AI-0 I7t01 
1.3.2. 
q A t q e on; ve, t ve, 
q A, q lI7*, 00, I- 062 (W. 
Replace the antecedent by the mix-free proof of 
and apply the 0 rule to get a 
1.3.3. Let P be 
Ak8 n, f&k 
ClAtoe on, ve,t 
q A, on*, Ge, t w>. 
By the same argument in 1.3.2 we get 
CIA, on*, oe, t . 
1.3.4. 
A, ekeI rr, 4 t e2 
p=oAy 08toh err, owoe2 
on, nn, ve t- ve, (au. 
This can be replaced by the following 00, mix-free proof 
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1.3.5. Let P be 
A, et-e1 n f%k 
q A, oe k oe, q I7, oe, t 
q A, on, get (oh). 
This can be replaced by the 00, mix-free proof 
A, e;“;7 ; elk(el). 
CIA, b& get 
The proof, when the logical rules involved are nonmodal, are as they appear 
in [38]. 
Case 2. rank(P) > 2. 
Case 2.1. Rank,(P) > 1. 
2.1.1. Let the inference be of the form 
A, II; k O1 ’ 
where the mix formula does not occur in A and sz is a logical rule. The thing to 
notice is that the logical rule involved cannot be a modal rule for, otherwise 
rank, = 1. Hence the proof follows as in Takeuti [38]. 
2.1.2. All other forms of inference with rank(P) > 2 and rank,(P) > 1 are as in 
Takeuti [38]. 
Case 2.2. rank,(P) = 1. Then rank,(P) > 1. In this case the only way a modal 
rule can be used in the left-hand antecedent is when it is of the form 
but this cannot be involved in a mix as the consequent is empty. All other 
instances of the present case are a repetition of the standard proof and are 
therefore omitted. q 
Theorem 2.1.4. If r t 9, is proved in the W-like calculus as originally proposed 
( i.e., with cut instead of mix), then r F Q, is provable without a cut. 
Proof. The usual proof works with the following two observations. 
(i) Cut and mix rules are equivalent. 
(ii) We can inductively traverse down a proof tree, and replace its first cut by a 
cut-free subtree, and then proceed down to the root. 0 
Consequences of freedom of cut 
The standard proofs of interpolation theorems follow from modifications, 
rather than the addition of cases, to usual proofs. 
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Lemma 2.1.5. Let r 1 Q, be provable and let 4, G be a partition of IY Then there 
is a sentence I# such that 
(i) GkVand V, Gkq; 
(ii) the nonlogical symbols of q!~ G L1 U Lz, where Lj = (nonlogical symbols of 
&} for i = 1, 2. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number k of inferences in the cut-free 
proof of r t q. 
Case (i). k = 0. Then rl- pl must be Q, F q. Take t& to be 97. 
Case (ii). k > 0. Then we need a case analysis on the last inference of the 
proof. Once again we give only the cases where the last inference is a modal rule 
and refer the rest to [38]. 
(1) Suppose the last inference is 
nte 
q Al-ue 
and A = A, U A2 is the partition of A. Then by inductive assumption we get a 8, 
satisfying A, I- 8, and AZ, 8,F 8. By applying 0 we get 
Now CIA1 U CIA, is a partition of q A, and 00, is the new sentence. 
(2) Suppose the last inference is 
A, 8, E e2 
on, 00, t 00, . 
Let q A,, 00, and iIlA2 be a partition of the lower antecedent. Then A,, 8, and 
A, are partitions of the upper antecedent. Hence by induction we can find 11, 
satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) of the lemma such that A,, 8, t- q and AZ, I@ t &. 
Then the following are admissible: 
Here the required sentence is 0~. 
(3) Suppose the last inference is 
and CIA,, 03 and O/i, are a partition. Hence A,, v and A2 are partitions of the 
upper antecedent. Therefore we get 8 satisfying A, F 19 and 8, A,, y,t, from 
which we get 
6 4, qk A,l-e 
08, ‘=%, Ovt 
and 
q A,toe’ 
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Suppose we want a I. such that CIA,, Oq F A. and I., CIA t . Then by the 
inductive assumption we can get 8 such that A,, I/J t and 8, A2 t. Hence 
4, Vbe 
04, O,~J FOe and 
0,&t 
00, q A,t- . 
So il can be taken as Of3 0 
Theorem 2.1.6 (Craig’s interpolation theorem). Suppose q and IJJ are two 
formulas such that Q, t $J. Then there is a formula 8 such that 
(i) qkOand Ok+; 
(ii) {nonlogical symbol s of t3} c {nonlogical symbols of q} f~ {nonlogical 
symbols of q}. 
Proof. Apply Lemma 2.15 with {q}, {a} as the partition to get the required 
0. cl 
2.2. Heyting modal algebras 
This section provides an 
algebras extending Heyting 
algebraic semantics by defining Heyting modal 
algebras, analogous to classical modal algebras 
extending Boolean algebras. The remaining sections are restricted to the algebraic 
version of propositional intuitionistic modal logic only. The extension to modal 
intuitionistic predicate logic can be developed following Rasiowa-Sikorski and 
Henkin-Tarski-Monk, and is not developed here. An additional symbol I is 
added to the syntax already given for falsehood. 
Definition 2.2.1. A structure (H, G, A, v ,+, I, T, L, M) is a Heyting modal 
algebra if 
(1) (H, S, A, v, 3, I, T) is a Heyting algebra, 
(2)(i) L: H- H satisfies L(T) = T, L(x n y) = L(x) n L(y), 
(ii) M: H-, H satisfies M is monotone, M(I) = I, L(x) II M(y) s M(x rl y). 
Definition 2.2.2. An assignment of intuitionistic propositional modal logic in a 
modal algebra His a function h with domain the set of atomic propositions, range 
a subset of H. Each assignment h has a unique extension to an ‘algebraic 
interpretation’ or homomorphism h mapping the set of all modal propositions to 
H as follows: 
h(l) = I, 
h(q, * 9) = h(v) A h(G), 
h(v v $) = h(v) v h(#), 
h(v+ @) = h(e) Jh(@), 
h(W) = L(h(q)), 
h(Ov) = M@(v)). 
Then Q, is called true, or valid, in the algebraic interpretation if h(q) = T. 
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Theorem 2.2.3 (Soundness theorem). If k q, then Q, is frue in all algebraic 
interpretations. 
Proof. Let h be an algebraic interpretation in a Heyting modal algebra. It is 
shown below that, if Q? is an axiom, then h(q) = T. Also, if 0 is derived from r by 
rules of proof and if h(T) = T, then h(8) = T. 
Axioms 
(1) The axioms of intuitionistic logic are valid in a Heyting algebra. 
(2) If Q, is q (O,-, 6$)+ (Cl8,-, El&), then 
h(o(e+ e2)+ (oe,+ 00,)) = h[w,+ e,)] 3 [h(w) +h(m)i 
= Uh(&--+ 0,) + [Uh(W) + W(W)1 = T, 
as it can be seen that L(P+ Q) < L(P)+Z(Q) because of the identity 
L(x II y) = Z_(X) rl L(y) and the monotonicity of L. 
(3) If cp is q (e,-+ f3,)+(OO,+OOJ, then 
h(q) = W((%-, 0,)) *[h(o&) *h(owl 
= Uh(W +h(%)l+ [M@(W) +Wh(%))l= T 
because from the argument below L(P + Q) A M(P) =Z M(Q). (Since ,5(P+ 
Q) A M(P) < M((P + Q) A P) G M(Q), it follows that L(P + Q) =G (M(P) j 
WQ>-1 
(4) If ~7 is q e1 A o(e, - e2)+ Oe,, observe that 
L(h(&)) A M(h(%) +h(%)) s M[h(ei) A (h(%) +h(%))l G W4Wl. 
Hence L(h(0,)) A M(h(8,))+M(h(8,)) = T. Therefore 
h[(& A O(&+ %))-+%I 
= L@(W) * M@(W) G’ Wr(%)) +Wr(%)) = T. 
(5) The axiom O(~JY A l(p)-, Q, A TQ, translates to O_L + I, and 
h(OL+I)=M(h(l)) + I=M(I) I$ I=1 3 I=T. 
Rules of inference 
Modus ponens follows from the usual argument. As for necessitation-i.e., if 
tq, then FE@, assume that h(q)= T. Then h(!Jq)=L(h(q))=L(T)= T. The 
soundness of the axiom system now follows. q 
Theorem 2.2.4 (Completeness theorem). Zf cp is valid in all algebraic 
interpretations, then t- q. 
Proof. The contrapositive is easily shown by assuming that tg, is not true and 
using the appropriate Lindenbaum algebra construction sketched below. Define 
the equivalence relation - on propositions as Q, - 0 iff q 18 and 8 t- q. Let H be 
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the set of equivalence classes [cp] under the relation -_ Define A, v, --, on 
H x H as usual and L: H-+ H and M: H+ H as L([q]) = [O~I) and M([q]) = 
[&J]. Then L and M are well-defined because Q, k 8 implies q Q, t 08 and also 
that 0~ t 00. The algebraic interpretation h :propositions+ H is defined by 
h(cp) = [VI. Th is implies that h(q) = T if 1 q. 
- L(T) = T follows since T I- Cl T, 
-L(x) n L(x) = L(n fly) follows since kOrp, A q vz++ q (g7, A cp*), 
-M(I) = -L follows from kO_L+ I, 
- that M is monotonic follows since vi 1 rp, implies 0~~ t 0cp2, 
- L(X) n k?(y) s M(.X n y) fOllOWS ince q 9 A 00 k o(q A 0). 
It is now seen that there is an algebraic interpretation h such that h(q) # T, 
contradicting the assumption. 0 
2.3. Topological models of constructive modal logic. 
In this section the standard interpretation of intuitionistic logic by open sets in 
a topological space is extended to accommodate the modal operators. The basic 
structure used is a topological space with a distinguished relation on its points. 
Definition 2.3.1. Let (T, z) be a topological space and let t be the collection of 
all open subsets of T. Let R c T x T be a relation. For each v E r define 
q v = lJ {u E r: R(u) E v}, ov = u {u E z:u E R-‘(v)}, 
where 
and 
R(u) = {y E T: R(x, y) for some x E u}, 
R-‘(u) = {x E T: R(x, y) for some y E u}. 
Definition 2.3.2. A topological interpretation of intuitionistic propositional modal 
logic in a topological model is a structure (T, z, R, h) such that 
(i) (T, -c) is a topological space and R is a relation on T. 
(ii) h : the set of propositions +r satisfying the following properties: 
(1) h(l) =O and h(T) = T, 
(2) h(q, v 412) = h(%) u h(Q)& 
(3) h(ql A ~2) = h(cp,) n h(Q)& 
(4) h(rp-+ ~2) = Wh(&” U h(&), 
(5) h(Oq) = q (h(q)), 
(6) h(Ov) = O@(v))- 
Definition 2.3.3. A proposition Q, is true (or valid) in a topological interpretation 
(T, z, R, h) if and only if h(q) = T. A proposition Q, is true (valid) if cp is true in 
all topological interpretations. 
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Lemma 2.3.4 (Soundness). Zf q is provable, then cp is true in all topological 
interpretations. 
Proof. In order to prove this, it is only necessary to see that the axioms are true 
and the rules of inference preserve truth. Only the modal axioms will be shown to 
be true. For the others, see a standard reference such as [40]. Pick any 
topological interpretation ( T, t, R, h). 
(1) Suppose that Q, is q l(q, + c&- (Clq,+ 0~~). To show that h(q) = T, it 
is enough to show that 
(U {u E z:R(u) E int(h(qJ U h(rpJ)]) f~ (U {U E t:R(u) &h(d)) 
Let A = h(qI) and B = h(rp,). Pick any u1 and u2 for which R(u,) c_int(A’U B) 
and R(uJ GA. Then 
R(uI fl u2) c R(u,) rl R(u,) E int(A’ U B) II A c B. 
Then u1 n u2 E (U {u E t: R(u) c h(rp,)}), justifying (1). 
(2) Suppose that Q, is q (v,+ v2)+ (0~ 40~~~). To show that h(q) = T, it 
is enough to show that (IJ {u E t: R(u) E int(A” U B)}) n (IJ {u : u E R-‘(A)}) E 
U({v:v G R-‘(B)}), where A =h(rp,) and B=h(q,). Pick any x ELL,II~,, 
where R(u,) G int(A” U B) and u2 G R-‘(A) for ul, u2 E t. Then x E u2 implies 
that there is a y EA with R(x, y). Then x E u1 and R(u,) c int(A” U B) imply 
y E int(A” U B) but y $ A’. Hence y E B. Hence x E R-‘(B). Hence u1 ll u2 E 
R-‘(B), justifying (2). 
(3) Suppose that cp is q g7, A O(qi + q2) - 0q12. To show that h(q) = T it is 
enough to show that 
(lJ {u E z:R(u) EA)) rl (IJ {u E z:u E R-‘(int(A’U B))}) 
+{UET:UER-l(B)}), where A = h(rp,) and B = h(q2). 
Pick any x E u1 fl u2, R(q) cA and u2 c R-‘(int(A” U B)) with ui, u2 E t. Then 
there exists a y E int(A’ U B) such that R(x, y). Then x E u1 and R(u,) G A imply 
y E A, because y E Int(A” U B). Hence y E B. Thus (3) follows. 
(4) Suppose that Q, is O(I)+ 1. Note that h(OJ_) = O(h(l)) =00=0. 
Hence h(01+ I) = T. 
For the modal rules, we must show that h( Cp) = T implies h(Cl+) = T. This is 
true because h(O@) = Cl(h#) = UT = LJ {u : R(u) G T} = T. 
This, combined with the proof of soundness of the topological interpretation 
for intuitionistic propositional logic, gives the soundness result that is sought. 0 
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0” E h(q) satisfying R(w’, CO”). Now, again by the inductive assumption, oY’ IF ~1. 
Hence o IFOq. 0 Claim 2.3.6. 
Now, back to the proof of Lemma 2.3.5. Note that h(q) = {o E W: w IF tp} by 
Claim 2.3.6. But wO lY 111, hence (T, z, R, h), as given above, is a topological 
interpretation in. which h( I/J) # T, so I/J fails. 0 
2.4. A homomorphism 
Every Heyting algebra is embeddable in a topological Heyting algebra. We 
generalize this, but get only a homomorphism. 
Definition 2.4.1. Let (H, =S, A, v, I$, I, T, L, M), (HI, sl, A~, vl, $+, II, 
T,, L1, Ml) be Heyting modal algebras. Then f : II-, H’ is a homomorphism if 
(i) f preserves the structure of the Heyting algebra operations, 
(ii) f@(q)) = Mf(cp)) and f(M(cp)) = Mf(cp)). 
Definition 2.4.2. An intuitionistic topological modal algebra is a topological space 
(T, IJ) with an arbitrary relation R in which 6, A, v, Ts, I, T, L, and M are 
interpreted as E, ll, U, 3, 0, T, 0 and 0 over the topology t, where 
(i) q lu and OU for u E r are defined as in Definition 2.3.1, 
(ii) u + v is defined as int(u” U v) for u, n E r. 
Theorem 2.4.3. Every Heyting modal algebras is homomorphically embeddable in 
an intuitionistic topological modal algebra by the f defined below. 
Proof. Let (H, C, A, v, 3, I, T, q , 0) be a given Heyting modal algebra. A 
topological modal algebra will be produced so that H is embeddable in it. Let H* 
be defined as {(u, 0~) : u is a prime filter of H and 0~ r$ u}. Define R, a binary 
relation on H*, by (u, Op) R (v, 04) if (i) if q y E U, then y E U; (ii) p 4 v. 
Let f : H+ P(H*) be defined as f (h) = {(u, Op) E H* : h E u}, and let r be the 
topology generated by taking {f(h) : h E H} = S as a basis. S is closed under finite 
intersections. Also, 
f @, v 4 =f (h,) ‘Jf (hz), 
f (h, * hJ =f (h,) nf (hz), 
f (hI +hz) = int(f (h,)’ Uf (h2)). 
We verify 
(1) f @a) = of (a) = U Iv E r:R(v) Ef (a)}, 
(2) f(Oa)=Of(a)=U{VEZ:vcR-‘(f(a))}. 
Verification of (1). We show that {(u, Op) E H* : q a E u} = U {v E z: R(v) E 
f(a)}. If q la E u and (u, Op) R (ul, Opl), then by definition of R, a E ul. Hence 
(u,, Op,) E f (a). Note that {(u, Op) E H* : q a E u} E z. Hence R({(u, Op) E 
H* : Eta E u}) E f (a). 
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Definition 3.1.1 (Semantics). ( W, S, R, It) is here called a model if 
- W is a collection of classical models, 
- G is a partial ordering on W, 
-REWXP(W), 
-for all o, w’, U with w G o’, if R(w, U), then there is a V E P(W) such that 
(i) NO’, V), 
(ii) for all 21 E V there is u E U such that u 2 U. 
Forcing is defined as II- in Definition 1.1.4 except for the following cases: 
(i) 0 It lJq7 if f or any o’ E W, and for any U E W satisfying w == IX’ and 
R( o’, U), we have that for all w” E U, 0” It q. 
(ii) o 110~ if there exists a U E P(W) with R(w, W) such that for all o’ E U, 
we have o’ II- q. 
Lemma 3.1.2. Zf o It cp and o c w’, then w’ It q~. 
Theorem 3.1.3 (Soundness). Zf Z t q, then r It- q. 
Proof. Only the two new axioms will be verified. 
(i) 1(02)+(01). If not o H-01, then there exist w’, w”, U such that 
o, o’ E W and U E W and o G IX’ and R(o’, U) and W” E U and not (d’lt I). 
This implies not (w lt~(OT)). 
(ii) (T+ q iq)+ q q. Suppose that (w It 0~) is false. Then there exist 
o, w’, W”E W and U G W with eY’E U satisfying o G w’ and R(w’, U) but not 
(o” It q). Hence not (w kOT+ 0~). 0 
Definition 3.1.4. Let F be the set of nontrivial prime filters of formulas that are 
deductively closed with respect to all the proof rules and axioms. Then 
(0, U) c F x P(F) is said to be an accessibility pair if, 
(i) 4 e w’ for all w’ E U implies O@ e 0, 
(ii) q $J E w implies # e w’ for all w’ E U. 
Lemma 3.1.5. Suppose that w E F and +$ E cr). Then there exists a U c F, with 
(w, U) an accessibility pair, such that @ E u for all u E U. 
Proof. Let V = { 4) U { 8 : 08 E w} ; let U be the set of all deductively closed 
minimal prime filters extending V, constructed in stages as given below. Let 
{ t#; v Si} be an enumeration of all sentences of the form tj~ v 8. Construct the set 
CJ, at stage n; U is the union of all U,. Index the elements of U, by 0 E {0, l}<,. 
Stage 0. Let U, = V,, with V, the deductive closure of V. 
Stage n. For each j G ti do the following. For each V, E U,, if qi v @, E V,, but 
T@j, #j$ V,, and if {+,} U V, is consistent, define V,, as the deductive closure of 
V, U {q,}_ Otherwise leave V,,, undefined. If { 6,) U V, is consistent, then define 
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V,-, as the deductive closure of V, U { ej}). Otherwise leave V,, undefined. If 
~j v 0, $ V,, define VOD, V,, as V,. Include V,-, and V,-, in U,,,. If CJ,, is finite, 
then so is II,,,. Let 
U={U V,<*:oEWU and V,,<. is defined for all n}, 
IlEO 
where a<” denotes the finite sequence that consist of the first n entries of u. 
Condition 3.1.4(ii) is satisfied by construction. For 3.1.4(i), suppose that OI& $ w. 
Then I# $ V,. Hence there exists a V, E U with t+!~ $ V,. Hence (w, U) is an 
accessibility pair. 0 
Lemma 3.1.6. Let w, o’ E F with w s CO’ and (w, U) an accessibility pair 
constructed as in Lemma 3.1.5. Then there exists a U’ E F such that 
(1) (o’, U’) is an accessibility pair, 
(2) for each u’ E U’, there exists a u E U such that u s u’. 
Proof. Let o, o’ and U be as given. Let V’ be the deductive closure of VI U V,, 
where V,={~:CI~EO’} and V,={@:$JEU for all UEU}. Then V’ is consis- 
tent. For otherwise, $Q, &k I for some Cl@, E o’ and O&E w. Hence q @,, 
O& I- 01 1 I, giving I E w’. Carry out the same construction as we did in the 
previous lemma using the V’ given in the present proof to obtain deductively 
closed prime filters which we name Vb. We verify that if Vb is defined, then so is 
V,, and V, c Vb. At the nth stage of the construction, for 3i v qi, if pi or vi is 
consistent with V&, then so is vi or vi consistent with V,<.. Hence if either of 
V&+I is defined, then so is V,<.+I. Further, if this is the case, then V,, c V& for 
k = 0, 1. The only thing left to verify is that for all p’ E U’, there exists a p’ E U 
with p up’. This follows from the way that p’ is obtained in the usual proof 
extending a filter to a prime filter. Namely, let {pi v pi} be a list of formulas such 
that cui v pi E U but neither ai, pi E U. Since p’ is a prime filter, for each i, either 
Cui or pi belongs to p’. Let that one be ‘yi. Now take p to be the minimal prime 
filter created by choosing yi for each step in extending U to a prime filter. Then 
I $p, otherwise I EP’. Cl 
Theorem 3.1.7 (Completeness with the additional axioms). Zf r t q, then r Ik cp. 
Proof. Suppose Q, is not provable from r. Extend r to G with GE F and Q, $ K, 
by Lemma 1.4.4. Construct the model as follows. Let W = F. Define < on W by 
or < w2 iff w1 c oz. Define R on W X Z’(W) as R(o, U) if there is an 0~ E w, 
with U defined from {q} U { 0 : Of3 E o} as given in Lemma 3.1.5. For each 
o E W and for an atomic proposition 8, define o IF 8 if 8 E w. Extend It- to all 
formulas as given in Definition 3.1.1. It can be verified that w It 0 if and only if 
8 E o by induction on the complexity of 8. Only the inductive cases for the modal 
connectives are provided below. 
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For 0. By Lemma 3.1.5, if 06 E w E F, then there is a U such that R(o, U) 
and 8 E o’ for all w’ E U, and hence o’ It 0 by the inductive assumption. Therefore 
w It 00. Conversely, if 00 4 o and if R(w, U), then by the proof of Lemma 
3.1.5, there exists a u E U with 13 $ U. Hence (o ItOO) is false. 
For 0. Suppose 08 E o. Then for any w’ E F and any U E F, if o G O’ and 
R(w’, U), then Cl8 E w’. Hence, by the definition of R, 8 E u for all u E U, thus 
by the inductive assumption, u It 8. Hence w Il- 08. Conversely, if 08 4 o, then 
U(I) 4 o. Hence l(OT) 4 o by Axiom (i). Therefore w U (C)T} is consistent, 
but UT, wXClB. For otherwise, OT, otCl6J. Hence wt-OT+ClO, and by 
Axiom (ii), w t 08. So 08 E o, a contradiction. Let o’ = o U {UT}, and extend 
o’ to W” E F so that 00 $ w”. Let U = { 1+9 : 0~) E co”}. Notice that U is a proper 
filter, and 8 $ U. Hence if we carry out the same procedure as in Lemma 3.1.5, we 
get U’ c W satisfying R(w”, U’) with 0 $ U’ for some U’ E U. Then by the 
inductive assumption, U’ lY 8. Hence o (r 00. q 
3.2. Algebraic and topological semantics 
Topological and algebraic semantics that correspond to the system of Section 
3.1 are presented in this section. The Heyting modal algebra satisfies lo(T)+ 
o(l) and (n(T)+ O(x))-+ O(xh corresponding to the new axioms added in 
Section 3.1. Interpretation in an algebraic model and the standard results of 
soundness and completeness follow by means of the method employed in 
Section 2. 
Definition 3.2.1 (Topological semantics for the additional axioms). Let (T, T> 
be a topological space with r the topology on T. Let R E T x (P(T) - (0)) satisfy 
V E z implies R-‘(V) E t. Then (T, z, R) is called a topological model for the 
system under consideration. 
For U E t, let OU = {x E T: V c_ U and R(x, V) for some subset V> = R*(U) 
(say) and q U= IJ {V:R(V) E U}, w h ere R(V) = {x E T : there is a subset U c V 
with R(x, U)}. The interpretation in a topological model is the same as in 
Definition 2.3.2. 
Theorem 3.2.2 (Soundness for the additional axioms). Zf Q, is provable, then 47 is 
valid. 
Proof. Suppose (T, z, R, h) is an interpretation into a topological model. Then 
it is necessary to verify that if k ~1, then h(q) = T. What is presented below is only 
a verification of the modal axioms and rules of inference. 
(1) When cp is the axiom q (q,,--, (P~)+(CI~~-,CI(P~), it is enough to show 
that 
(U {U:RV-J) E Wh(vd” uh(vJ)>) n (U {U:R(U) c Npid}) 
CU {U:R(U)zh(qz)}. 
298 D. Wijesekera 
Pick any U,, U, with R(Q) ~int(h(~r)“Uh(~,)) and R(&) Go. Since 
R(U, n 6) E R(Q) n R(G), we get R(Q n G) E 0~~). 
(2) When Q, is the axiom q (QI,-+ (pJ+= (O~,+OcpJ, it is enough to show 
that 
Pick an x E U, rl R*(h(qJ), w h ere R(UJ E int(h(q,)‘U h(&). Then there exists 
a V c h(q,) satisfying R(x, V). By definition of R(U,) we get V E int(h(qI)c U 
h(~lJ). Hence x E int(h(q,)‘U h(q2)) n h(cpl) c h(cp,). Hence x E R*(h(&). 
(3) When 47 is 01 + i , this is true since R *(0) = 0. 
(4) When 47 is TOT-, O(l), we need to show that 
int[R*(T)‘] c IJ {U: R(U) c 0}. 
This is true since x E int[R*(T)“] . tm pl ies that there is no V # 0 with R(x, V). 
(5) When Q, is (UT-+ Eiq)+ q q, we need to show that 
int[R*(T)‘U (U {U E t:R(U)rh(q)})] ~U{u:R(U)ch(v)). 
This is true because if x E R*(T)‘, then R(x, V) is not true for any V. 0 
Theorem 3.2.3 (Completeness for the additional axioms). Zf r II- q, then r F v. 
Proof. Assume not rt- Q.J and produce a Kripke model for not r It QX Use the 
same methods as in Lemma 2.3.5 to turn this into a topological model. q 
3.3. Ewald’s axioms 
The system of modal logic developed by Ewalds [7] uses more axioms than 
presented here, and is too restrictive to cover our intended application to 
constructive concurrent dynamic logic. Plotkin and Stirling [33] presented an 
equivalent set of axioms. We sketch the Ewalds-Stirling-Plotkin system here, 
because it has the right conditions for describing constructive sequential dynamic 
logic. 
Semantics 
Definition 3.3.1. ( W, <, R) is said to be an (Ewald-Plotkin-Stirling) Kripke 
model if 
(i) W is a collection of classical models, 
(ii) < is a partial order on W and R s W x W is a relation satisfying the 
following conditions: 
a 
6; 
Z.Q 2 or and R(o,, 02) implies that there exists a u2s w2 with R(uI, u2). 
u2s w2 and R(o,, w2) implies that there exists a u1 3 w, with R(uI, 1.4~). 
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Definition 3.3.2. The definition of forcing is the same as before except for the 
modal connectives, for which they are defined as 
(i) o II-Oq if th ere exists a w’ satisfying R(o, 0’) and w’ II- q, 
(ii) 0 It-•lq, if for all w’, 0” satisfying w’ 2 o and R(w’, w”), we have ~“lt pl. 
Axioms 
(1) Axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic. 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
(35) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
Rules of inference 
(I) q, ~+ete, 
Note. Provability now means with respect to all new axioms and proof rules. 
Theorem 3.3.3. r t Q, if and only if r It q. 
Proof. In Ewalds [7]. 0 
Theorem 3.3.4. Adding OT v -$OT) and q (q v 8)+Clq, v Cl8 to the axioms 
and imposing further conditions (c) and (d) below on the Kripke models of 
Definition 3.3.1 gives a sound and complete system. 
(c) Wl c ul and R(u,, UJ implies there is a W,S u2 with R(w,, wJ; 
(4 W,S u2 and R(u,, u2) implies there is a w1 c u1 with R(wI, w2). 
Proof. See Ewalds [7]. 0 
Plotkin and Stirling also presented an equivalent system in their extended 
abstract [33]. 
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